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Introduction
Like other regions in the world, Latin America and the Caribbean
(LAC) are in a demographic transition with a rising old-age depend-
ency ratio. Aging populations have serious long-term consequences
for labor and capital markets, health and pension systems, and
macroeconomic and financial equilibriums. In the case of pension
reforms, conventional pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems based
on defined benefits (DB) are particularly put under stress by aging,
as rising population dependency ratios lead to increasing PAYG
system deficits. Parametric PAYG reform—raising contribution rates
and lowering pension benefits—has been the conventional way to
address growing financial imbalances of pension systems worldwide.
However, parametric reforms often intensify adverse distributional
and efficiency consequences of PAYG systems.
The alternative way—structural reform of DB-PAYG systems by
replacing them at least in part by fully funded (FF) systems based on
defined contributions (DC)—has been spearheaded in LAC. To date,
12 countries have adopted multi-pillar pension systems that include
an FF pillar. Hence, LAC is the region with the largest number of
reformed pension systems in the world. However, reformed pension
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systems come with their own new problems, often compounded by
continuing population aging.
In my presentation, I review the progress made in reforming Latin
America’s pension systems, analyze the results of pension reforms, and
assess the reformed systems’ new challenges that policymakers must
address under conditions of accelerating aging. First, I briefly review
population aging in the region. Then I discuss the main design
features of alternative pensions systems to identify the problems of
Latin America’s traditional PAYG systems that motivated pension
system reform. Then I briefly review Chile’s pioneer pension reform
in 1981 and review subsequent pension reforms in Latin America.
Chile’s long post-reform experience allows a quantitative assessment
of its macroeconomic and growth effects, a subject that I revise next.
Finally, I analyze five challenges faced by policymakers in unreformed
and reformed pension systems, most of which are compounded by
accelerating demographic transition.
Demographic trends in Latin America  1
Demographic transition toward an older population structure is
accelerating in Latin America. As a result of declining mortality rates
and even more rapidly falling fertility rates, population growth is
currently on a strong downward trend in the region, at a level similar
to the world’s average rate (Chart 1). Population aging is reflected by
a rising old-age dependency ratio1, which is starting to accelerate in
the region and is projected to increase from 8.5 elderly per 100
working-age people today to a ratio of 27 by the year 2050 (Chart 2).
Substantial demographic differences are observed within Latin
America. Uruguay, Argentina, and Barbados exhibit the highest
dependency ratios in 2000, at 20.7, 15.5, and 15, respectively, while
Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay have the lowest ratios, at less than 6.6
(Chart 3). Large increases in old-age dependency for the next half-
century are projected for all countries, with some attaining
dependency ratios that may even exceed the averages projected for the
OECD in 2050 (Chart 4). Hence, all of LAC will be facing growingPolicy Challenges of Population Aging and Pension Systems in Latin America 259
Chart 1 
































































Sources: ECLAC and OECDpolicy challenges derived from population aging, like industrial coun-
tries do today.
That old-age dependency will rise as Latin America’s GDP per
capita rises should come as no surprise. Indeed, in the region, as
everywhere, a significant positive correlation is observed between
economic development and old-age dependency. Four of the five
countries with the highest old-age dependency today—Uruguay,
Argentina, Barbados, and Chile—also exhibit the region’s highest per
capita GDP levels at PPP (Chart 5). Future growth and development,
complemented by policies in support of health, population planning,
and female labor market participation, will contribute to accelerate
population aging in the region. But aging itself brings new challenges
to policymakers, including rising financial, managerial, and political















































































































































































































Old-Age Dependency Ratios in LAC Countries, 
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Chart 5
Per Capita GDP and Old-Age Dependency 
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Design features of pension systems    2
Following Lindbeck and Persson (2002), pension systems can be
defined in three dimensions by their main features related to system
design and implementation: funding, actuarial fairness, and risk
sharing (Table 1). Let me briefly refer to these dimensions and their
implications for macroeconomic flows and factor markets as a back-
drop for assessing pension reforms in LAC.
First, pension systems differ by the degree of explicit funding of
their liabilities, ranging from fully funded systems backed by explicit
pension assets or reserves, to totally unfunded systems that lack any
reserves, with pension benefits typically financed on a pay-as-you-go
basis, with continuing payments from currently active to currently
passive population cohorts. Starting a PAYG scheme involves a large
income transfer to initial cohorts from all subsequent generations,
with typically large adverse effects on long-term levels of income,
wages, consumption, and welfare, only in part dampened by partial
intergenerational links or integration into the world economy.Policy Challenges of Population Aging and Pension Systems in Latin America 263
Table 1
Pension System Design Features and Prevalence in 
Latin America and the Caribbean
The opposite effects are observed with a pension reform that
replaces a PAYG scheme by a fully funded system, when the reform
transition deficit is financed by fiscal adjustment. However, when the
transition deficit is financed by issuing net government liabilities,
there are no first-order effects on future saving and income levels, or
on future factor prices. Hence, aggregate saving effects of reform grow
with the share of the transition deficit that is paid by transition gener-
ations, and with the degree of non-neutrality of larger government
saving and new mandatory pension saving. Under imperfect integra-
tion into world financial markets, long-term levels of capital and
income will rise as a result of the reform. By channeling pension
saving to domestic financial markets, a pension reform can also
contribute to financial and capital market development.
Let me now turn to actuarial fairness.When for every individual the
present value of his or her pension contributions is closely related to
the present value of pension benefits at relevant discount rates, actu-
arial fairness is ensured. This is typically the case in fully funded
pension systems, where individuals hold pension assets in individual
accounts. In contrast, unfunded systems are typically actuarially
unfair, especially when they are not mature and when old-age
dependency ratios are rising. Yet, in mature PAYG systems with a
stationary dependency ratio and a stable share of labor income, the
capitalized difference between the market rate of return and income
growth—which is the rate of return to worker contributions—is still
an implicit tax on labor employed in sectors that comply with
Funding
Risk sharing PAYG FF
Act. fair Unfair Act. fair Unfair
Defined benefits
(DB) Most pre-reform  Reformed systems:
systems pension annuity phase
Defined Reformed  systems:
contributions (DC) contribution phase264 Vittorio Corbo
pension regulations. Therefore, a pension reform toward a fully funded
scheme typically contributes to reducing the implicit labor tax and,
hence, to a shift from informal to formal sector employment, resulting
in higher labor productivity and lower structural unemployment.
Third, PAYG systems are nominally defined benefit schemes;
hence, individuals are protected on paper against market risks affect-
ing pension asset returns. However, in practice, PAYG systems are
prone to political, demographic, and economic risks that lead to
frequent failure to comply with promised benefits. As opposed to
PAYG schemes, most fully funded systems impose a defined contri-
bution scheme during the years of pension asset accumulation. For
the passive stage of pension benefit payments, the reformed systems
offer pensioners two options: programmed withdrawals from their
pension capital or pension annuities bought with their pension
capital. The rate-of-return risk of programmed withdrawals is borne
by the pensioner, while the rate-of-return risk of the pension annuity
is borne by the annuity provider (typically an insurance company).
However, in the case of government guarantees, the residual risk is
borne by the government. Hence, generally participants of reformed
pension systems bear market return risks but are better shielded
against the political risks borne by participants of unreformed
pension systems. 
Latin America’s pre-reform pension systems 3 
and motivations for reform     
Latin America’s unreformed pension systems—like elsewhere in the
world—were predominantly defined benefit, PAYG systems managed
by state social security institutions. Contributions were weakly related
to pension benefits and risks were presumably borne by governments.
However, PAYG system maturation and recurring demographic,
economic, and political economy shocks led to widely differentiated
retirement benefits, poor management of assets, and ultimately rising
pension deficits. The latter were financed initially by government
general revenue but requiring eventually parametric reforms, that is,Policy Challenges of Population Aging and Pension Systems in Latin America 265
unforeseen adjustments in contribution rates, retirement ages, and
pension benefits.
Moderately high old-age dependency ratios that led to rising
pension deficits were prevalent only in the three Southern Cone
countries: Argentina, Uruguay, and Chile. Argentina and Uruguay
had implicit pension debt ratios close to 300 percent of GDP by the
time of their reforms, while Chile had an implicit debt close to 140
percent of GDP (Chart 6). However, in eight other Latin American
reforming countries, implicit pension debt levels were much smaller,
reflecting lower pension system coverage and earlier stages of demo-
graphic transition. This suggests that additional non-demographic
and financial factors also played a part in motivating pension reforms.
High and rising implicit pension taxes on formal-sector employ-
ment contributed in the region to increasing informal employment,
higher unemployment, early retirement, and low female labor partic-
ipation. Inefficient state bureaucracies led to ballooning management
costs and increasing dissatisfaction of the people with their pension
systems. Highly fragmented schemes with opaque but large intra-
system differences in net pension deficits and replacement ratios led
to equally opaque and often regressive intra-generational redistribu-
tion. Old schemes also contributed to financial underdevelopment
and lower saving, investment, productivity, and income levels in the
region. Gradual realization of these economic and social costs moti-
vated pension reform in the region. Moreover, pension reform was
part of a new development strategy based on market liberalization,
trade openness, and privatization that took hold in the region during
the 1990s. The successful implementation of the Chilean 1981
pension reform was an additional factor behind the reform drive.
Chile’s 1981 reform 4
The reform to the Chilean pension system in 1981 was the first
experience in the world in replacing a mandatory state-managed
PAYG system by a mandatory privately managed fully funded system.
The compulsory element of the reform was based on the premise thatworkers lack foresight about the need to save for their retirement. By
construction, the main component of the new system is actuarially
fair and fully funded. It is based on three components or pillars: 
1. Pillar one: assistance and minimum pensions, which are guaran-
tees provided by the government to low-income individuals.
2. Pillar two: compulsory contributions toward pension benefits
based on capitalized contributions; hence it is actuarially fair.
3. Pillar three: voluntary saving for old age, on top of the compul-
sory contributions, supported by government tax incentives.
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Chart 6
Implicit Pension System Debt Ratio to GDP 
in Selected Countries (Percent)






















* By the time of the reform.   
** By 1990.
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The reform changed two additional key features of the pension
system: the role of government and the transition toward the system’s
steady state. With respect to the role of government, Chile’s 1981
pension reform eliminated gradually but fully the old pension system.
Government ownership was replaced by private ownership of pension
fund management companies—known as AFP for “Administradora
de Fondos de Pensiones”—and life insurance companies. AFPs are
responsible for collection and record-keeping of individual pension
assets, investing pension assets in capital markets, and paying out
benefits to pensioners in cases of programmed withdrawals. Life
insurance companies pay out annuities and handle the death and
disability insurance component. The reform put into place a special-
ized supervisory agency (the superintendent of AFP) to develop the
regulation and to provide real-time supervision of the pension fund
management industry. 
The new pension system strengthens government functions in the
provision of pension insurance. Government provides guarantees in
pillars one and two. In pillar one the responsibility of the government
has two components: a means-tested basic welfare pension for people
who have not participated in the system (financed by general govern-
ment revenue) and a minimum pension guarantee for people who
have contributed to the system but have not been able to save suffi-
ciently for the minimum pension threshold. Pillar two is supported
by government guarantees against idiosyncratic risk on pension fund
investment returns and pension assets held by AFPs and insurance
companies.2 Hence, risks are shared by contributors, who bear the
absolute rate of return risk, and by the state, which bears minimum
pension guarantees and relative rate of return risks. 
With respect to reform transition, most active pension system
participants in 1981 were given the option of shifting to the new
scheme, while new labor market entrants were required to enroll in it.
The gradual nature of the transition implies that the macroeconomic
and growth effects arise more gradually. After a parametric reform was
implemented reducing significantly PAYG system deficits and
implicit debt levels, the radical 1981 reform maintained promised268 Vittorio Corbo
PAYG benefits to people who were already retired or would retire
after the reform. The reform recognized explicitly contributions of all
PAYG system participants who opted for the new pension pillar in
the form of a government bond that is paid at the time of retirement.
In Chile, the transition financing was facilitated by fiscal adjustment;
hence, the current generation assumes an important fraction of the
reform costs. 
The pension system has grown remarkably since the early 1980s. As
of 2002, second-pillar contributors had grown to 58 percent of the
labor force. Pension fund assets had attained close to 60 percent of
GDP, with a real gross average return of 10.4 percent per year in the
post-reform 1981-2002 period. This was possible because Chile
implemented broad economic reforms during this period, including
macroeconomic stabilization, product market liberalization, and
financial reforms, which resulted in a quantum leap in the average
annual GDP growth, to 4.6 percent during 1981-2002. Thus,
pension savings have been put to good use thanks to better policies
and improved institutions. The average mandatory new pension
saving flows have been equivalent to 4.6 percent of GDP during the
latter period (Chart 7). 
A critical measure of pension system performance is “coverage of
benefits,” which measures the share of the elderly who receive pension
benefits or are not poor. Valdés (2003) reports that the poverty rate
among people aged 65 or more was 7.3 percent in 2000, significantly
lower than the poverty rate of the general population (Table 2).
Measuring replacement rates is difficult due to the short history of the
system. However, Palacios (2003) reports simulations of net replace-
ment rates for males who contribute during their full working life to
the reformed pension system, using the average lifetime wage as
denominator. He reports replacement rates for Chile’s reformed
system that range between 59 percent and 67 percent for workers
earning from 0.5 to 2.5 times average wages. The system has built-in
microeconomic incentives to postpone retirement: One year of earlier
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Chart 7
Chile’s Reform: Selected Results
Source: Superintendent of AFPs
Table 2
Old-Age Population in Chile by Income Source (2000)
Source: Valdés 2003
Men Women Total
Population at age 65 or above 504,739 663,534 1,168,273
Received a pension 81% 52% 65%
Not pension but personal monetary  13% 23% 18%
income above minimum pension
Not pension but household per capita  1.9% 16% 10%
monetary income above minimum pension
Poor 4.6% 9.3% 7.3%
contributions, and additional lower benefits from one year more of
retirement.
State of progress of systemic pension reform 5 
in Latin America
In the early 1990s, more than a decade into Chile’s 1981 reform,
11 LAC countries started to adopt similar pension reforms: Peru
(1992-1993), Colombia (1994), Argentina (1994), Uruguay (1996),
Mexico (1997), Bolivia (1997), El Salvador (1998), Costa Rica270 Vittorio Corbo
(1995-2000), Dominican Republic (2001), Nicaragua (2000), and
Ecuador (2001). Their common pattern was an adoption of a multi-
pillar pension structure, with the second pillar comprising a privately
managed, defined contribution, fully funded system. In addition to
government guarantees on this pillar, in some reform countries like
Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, the first pillar also comprises a
state-managed PAYG system, financed by mandatory worker contri-
butions, with a redistributive objective aimed at providing old-age
income security.
Population aging exerts an important influence on fiscal conditions
and political factors that explain the share of pension systems replaced
by the reform. An expected rise in future dependency ratios could
spur a deeper reform now in order to save on future fiscal costs.
However, the political support for the no-reform status quo could
increase with the share of pensioners. In contrast, contributing gener-
ations may support pension reform as they become aware of the rising
costs and poor expected benefits of the existing system but may
oppose a reform that rests on their shoulders. 
Minimum pension guarantees also differ across reformed pension
systems. Also, there are substantial differences in replacement ratios
across income groups and countries due to heterogeneity in the level
of total system contributions and in the relative size of the second
pillar. Fixed commissions and pension benefit redistribution toward
low-income participants also influence these differences.
Pension reforms imposed ceilings on private fund investments to
limit excessive risk taking and possible moral hazard in investment
decisions—and they also vary strongly across countries. A critical issue
is the possibility to invest pension funds abroad, particularly in coun-
tries with limited domestic investment opportunities or with dramatic
population aging (Table 3). Regarding structures and limits on
commissions, while all countries impose contribution-based variable
commissions on wages, differences exist in complementary commis-
sions, including fixed, asset-based, and return-based commissions.Finally, pension annuities and scheduled withdrawals are the two
forms of retirement plans adopted in all reformed systems.
Macroeconomic and growth effects of Chile’s pension reform 6
In recent work with Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Corbo and Schmidt-
Hebbel 2003), we assessed the macroeconomic and growth impact of
Chile’s pension reform in the period spanned from 1981 to 2001. As
I mentioned before, the reform has potential effects on growth
through three main channels: saving and investment flows, labor
markets, and capital markets (Chart 8). Other reforms adopted in
Chile helped and complemented the pension reform, including fiscal
stabilization, trade opening, labor market reforms, domestic and
external financial liberalization, and capital market reform. 
In order to estimate the reform’s saving and investment effects, we
used empirically validated ranges for the government’s financing
sources of transition deficits, the private-sector saving response to
public and mandatory saving flows, and the substitution between
national and external saving. We found that the reform raised the
average annual national saving rate by a point estimate of 2.3 percent
Policy Challenges of Population Aging and Pension Systems in Latin America 271
Table 3
Upper Limits on Private Pension Fund Investments 
by Instruments
Source: Palacios 2003, except for Chile, for which 2004 limits are reported
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Links from Pension Reform to Economic Growth
of GDP during 1981-2001 and the average annual domestic invest-
ment rate by a point estimate of 1.2 percent of GDP. 
Regarding labor markets effects, the reduction in pension contribu-
tion rates and the rise in actuarial fairness brought by the reform led
to a significantly lower pure tax on formal employment, which we
analyzed using a dual labor-market model. We found that the reform
raised total employment by 1.3 percent to 3.7 percent, with a signif-
icant change in employment composition toward formal-sector
activities, a change that led also to higher average labor productivity. 
New mandatory savings have made a significant contribution to
Chile’s  financial deepening. We estimated that 31 percent to 46
percent of the large increase in the ratio of financial assets to GDP
was due to the growth of pension funds between 1981 and 2001.
Then we estimated that 20 percent of TFP growth in the same period
was due to the increase in financial deepening caused by pension
savings, always controlling for other factors and structural reforms.Policy Challenges of Population Aging and Pension Systems in Latin America 273
Finally, we used a standard production function for the Chilean
economy to quantify the reform’s consequences for GDP growth,
combining the effects on capital, labor, and factor productivity. Chile
grew by 4.6 percent per year during 1981-2001 (Table 4). Our point
estimate for the contribution of the latter growth performance is 0.5
percent, within a range of 0.2 percent to 0.9 percent. That is, approx-
imately one-tenth of Chile’s growth during the 21 years after the
reform could be attributed to the effects of pension reform. As a
consequence of the latter result, our point estimate of the pension
reform’s contribution to Chile’s 2001 GDP level is 5 percent, within
a range from 2 percent to 10 percent. For the future, further reform
benefits will tend toward zero, as the old PAYG system is gradually
abolished and the economy converges to its new stationary equilib-
rium path.
Policy challenges of population aging and pension reform 7
Demographic change in the region confronts policymakers with
important challenges, in both unreformed and reformed pension
systems. The growth and welfare costs of unreformed PAYG pension
systems, as well as the fiscal transition costs of a reform, rise with an
aging population structure. Therefore, it is highly advisable to improve
public debt dynamics and implement deep pension reforms before
attaining advanced stages of demographic maturity. Several reforming
countries that have maintained a large state-managed, defined benefit,
pay-as-you-go pillar, might also consider expanding the relative size of
their second defined contributions, fully funded pillars. 
But reformed pension systems face important challenges of their
own, many of them compounded by population aging. First,
pension reforms imply making large implicit PAYG debts explicit
and incurring in large fiscal costs to finance reform transitions (Table
5). One way to reduce the fiscal burden of the reform is by way of a
parametric reform of the old system. After downsizing the old
regime, the crucial next step is deciding how much of the old system
is to be replaced by a fully funded second pillar in the long term. In
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participants during the first reform year. However, financial and
political constraints make this impossible; in fact, all reforming coun-
tries spread out the fiscal consequences of pension reform over many
decades to avoid up-front bunching of large fiscal deficits in a few
years. The decision about how to finance pension deficits depends on
overall fiscal policy goals that have to be taken into account when
considering the large first-order effects on welfare and income levels
of current and future generations that arise from reform financing
through non-pension government surpluses.
A second challenge relates to state guarantees (Table 6). Reformed
systems have established several government guarantees or insurance
programs that benefit contributors and pensioners. Guarantees are of
two types: government insurance of pension assets and returns, and
means-tested minimum-pension insurance against low pension levels.
Out of 11 reformed systems, the former exists in eight and the latter
in six countries. Guarantees are off-budget implicit liabilities, not
backed by actuarial calculation of their economic value, and are
uncertain because they are sensitive to future macroeconomic, finan-
cial, and demographic shocks and developments. Bennett and
Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) estimate that future costs of Chile’s
minimum pension guarantees, currently at 0.05 percent of GDP, are
likely to grow exponentially in the future to attain 1.7 percent of
GDP by 2030. Countries with more generous guarantees may face
Table 5
Annual Pension Reform Transition Deficits and 
Present Values of Transition Deficits in Selected 
LAC Countries (Percent of GDP)







*During the first years after the reform.
** After reforming public pillar.
Source: Schmidt-Hebbel 1999Absolute rate Relative rate Benefit Minimum
of return of return payout pension
gurantees guarantees
Argentina X X X
Bolivia
Colombia X X
Chile X X X
Costa Rica
Dominican Rep. X X







Government Guarantees in LAC’s Reformed Pension Systems
Source: Palacios (2003)
even larger fiscal costs, which might be amplified by population
aging. Also, like all insurance schemes, these programs cause effi-
ciency and welfare costs. In order to reduce assistance pension
payments and raise replacement rates, Chile adopted a reform in
August 2004 that, among other things, established more stringent
requirements for early retirement. 
A third challenge is how to address one of the main criticisms of the
reformed systems: excessively high commission charges by pension fund
management companies (Table 7). Among the factors that may
contribute to this problem are the low responsiveness of contributors
to commission differences between pension fund managers, excessive
marketing costs, and lack of competition among a few pension funds
operating in an industry where fixed costs are high. One proposal put
forward is to open up the specialized industry of pension fund
management companies to competition by banks and insurance
companies. However, this requires careful evaluation to avoid exces-
sive risks in pension fund management and investment that may arise
if firewalls between pension fund management activities and other
financial operations of non-specialized institutions, like banks, are
not maintained.The fourth challenge is related to labor force coverage (Chart 9).
Pension reform has contributed little or nothing to raise coverage of
the labor force in the region. Moreover, many workers in Latin
America go through extended periods of unemployment or informal
employment, during which they stop contributing. Yet, it is difficult
for a reformed pension system that provides actuarially fairer pension
benefits to contribute to higher employment formality if Latin
America’s other strong incentives for informality are maintained, in
the form of high regulatory and tax burdens—and lax enforcement
thereof—on formal production and employment.
Finally, funded pension systems in aging societies could pose risks
to financial market stability. Pension reform could raise the probabil-
ity of banking crises due to reallocation of savings from bank deposits
toward other financial instruments (Davis 2004). Additional poten-
tial sources of financial instability include moral hazard and herding
behavior among institutional investors and large-scale asset sales and
asset price deflation when large numbers of people start retiring. 
The latter trends may certainly materialize. However, they are not
likely to pose risks in the form of unanticipated high-frequency events
leading to sudden financial crises. The changes described here take
time to build up, allowing financial markets, regulators, and central
banks to prepare for them.
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Table 7
Commissions in LAC’s Reformed Pension as a Share of Assets* 
*Net commissions, excluding survivorship and disability insurance contributions.
Source: AIOS




El Salvador 3.4 2.8
Mexico 3.4 3.0
Peru 3.5 2.7
Uruguay 1.7 1.1278 Vittorio Corbo











Pension System Coverage in Latin America
Source: Gill and others 2004
Conclusions 8
LAC’s demographic trends show that population aging is accelerat-
ing. Twelve countries in LAC have implemented systemic pension
reforms that involve a (partial) shift from pay-as-you-go toward fully
funding, an increase in actuarial fairness, and more explicit bearing of
return risk by pension system contributors. Faced with accelerating
population aging, countries that have not yet implemented structural
pension reform should consider doing so, the sooner the better.
Chile’s radical 1981 reform has had important growth effects stem-
ming from higher saving and investment flows, reduced labor market
distortions, and deeper capital markets.Policy Challenges of Population Aging and Pension Systems in Latin America 279
Reformed pension systems in Latin America face policy challenges,
compounded by population aging, in four areas: 1) how to finance
pension transition deficits, 2) how to face growing fiscal costs and
adverse incentive effects of government guarantees, 3) how to reduce
high commissions charged by private pension fund managers, and 4)
how to raise typically low labor force coverage. Addressing these prob-
lems effectively will require changes in pension systems,
complemented by imaginative fiscal and structural reforms in capital
and labor markets.
Author’s note: The author thanks Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel and Alvaro Aguirre from the
Research Department of the Central Bank of Chile for their important contributions.Endnotes
1Old-age dependency is defined as the ratio of population older than 64 years to
the population of age 15 to 64 years multiplied by 100.
2There is a minimum level for the rate of return over pension assets determined
as a fraction of the median rate of return of the system. If an AFP doesn’t achieve
this level, it has to pay the difference with its own capital. If this is not enough the
state completes the difference with public funds and the AFP is liquidated.
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